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REGULATING THE SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM IN CHINA
By: Megan Lindgren
The Chinese financial system has grown significantly since the People’s Bank of China
(PBC) began functioning as the central bank in 1983 and the Shanghai Stock Exchange was
established in 1990.1 Total assets of banking institutions grew from 40 trillion yuan in 2006 to
210 trillion yuan in 2016.2 Increasing financial sophistication in China is both a blessing and a
curse. Commercial enterprises and investors welcome the wider array of financial products
available today, but regulators face the challenge of maintaining financial stability in an
increasingly complex market. Other actors, such as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),
have been left out of the mainstream financial system and have turned to alternative funding
sources such as shadow banking.
This paper aims to explore the development of the shadow banking system in China.
Shadow banking is broadly defined as credit intermediation that occurs through activities and
entities outside the regular financial system.3 Due to formal and informal constraints by the PBC
on the amount and quality of lending in China, businesses without access to the four major statecontrolled commercial banks have resorted to shadow banking as a substitute source of credit.
The Chinese shadow banking system is growing rapidly by overall size and proportion of global
shadow banking activities. Based on the Financial Stability Board’s “narrow” measure of
shadow banking, it currently accounts for $7 trillion of $45 trillion global shadow banking assets
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and grows 29% annually.4 Shadow banking supports economic growth and investment by
providing wider access to affordable credit. However, it also greatly increases risk in both the
domestic and international financial systems.
This paper is organized as follows: Part I provides an overview of the types and size of
shadow banking activities in China. Part II explains how shadow banking developed in China
and identifies three major drivers: 1) demand for credit to support business investment and
economic growth 2) lack of regulatory expertise and oversight and 3) restriction of credit after
the global financial crisis in 2009. Part III explores the benefits of shadow banking as a source of
needed credit, especially during China’s transition up the economic value chain. It also
highlights the risks of shadow banking, including lack of transparency and barriers to systemic
risk assessment, implicit government guarantees, and corruption and criminal penalties. Part IV
offers policy proposals for legal and institutional reform and reduced government intervention in
macroeconomic planning. Additionally, it includes a brief analysis of broader domestic and
international pressures on the Chinese financial system.
I.

THE SCOPE OF SHADOW BANKING IN CHINA
A. Types of Shadow Banking in China
Shadow banking is a general term that encompasses a wide variety of bank and non-bank

credit activity. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York defines shadow banking as credit
intermediation outside the regular financial system without protection from either the central
bank as a lender of last resort or public deposit insurance programs.5 In China particularly, credit
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intermediation can be classified into three categories based on the source of funds and
cumulative distance from the original lender.6
First, the creditor stage includes wealth management products (WMPs) and trust
products.7 WMPs issued by banks, trusts, and securities firms are investment products that
provide a higher yield than traditional bank deposits based on performance of specific underlying
assets.8 WMPs are usually purchased by wealthy individuals seeking target returns, although
interbank WMPS are becoming more common.9 Trust products include trust loans, non-listed
equity, and traded financial instruments purchased by both wealthy individuals and corporate and
institutional investors.10
Second, the intermediate stage consists of financial system interlinkages including banktrust cooperation, bank-securities brokerage cooperation, and bank-to-bank trust beneficiary
rights transfers.11 Bank-trust cooperation and bank-securities brokerage cooperation relationships
are used to transfer money from WMPs to trust companies and investment products to securities
brokerages, respectively.12 The purpose of transferring management and holding of assets from
banks to trust companies through such vehicles is to remove loans from bank balance sheets. For
example, trust beneficiary rights are derivative transactions in which the purchaser receives a
proportion of trust returns in exchange for keeping assets off-book.13 Bank-to-bank trust
beneficiary rights transfers shift loan and debt security exposures to other banks through a single-
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investor trust that then loans the money to the ultimate borrower.14 This technique shifts credit
risk from one bank to another while avoiding or decreasing regulatory burdens.
Third, the ultimate borrower stage includes a range of forms of lending. Entrusted loans
are loans between two corporations with a bank as an intermediate fiduciary to side-step bans on
direct lending to corporates.15 Trust loans operate like traditional bank loans, with funding from
bank-issued WMPs or wealthy individual and institutional investors.16 While trust companies are
technically regulated by the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), they have rather
flexible charters and are not subject to normal banking regulation.17 Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending
matches saver-lenders and users-borrowers via online platforms.18 Other informal lending exists,
such as loans by pawn shops or small businesses, but much of this activity is illegal.19
B. Size of the Shadow Banking Market in China
It is difficult to precisely calculate the size and growth rate of the shadow banking system
in China. The market lacks transparency because a significant amount of credit intermediation
occurs off balance sheets and goes unregulated.20 Therefore, statistical records from domestic
regulators and international organizations are incomplete and likely underestimate the true
amount of shadow banking activity in China.
The most current and reliable data is available through the Financial Stability Board
(FSB). For the first time in 2017, the FSB was able to collect baseline data on China and include
the country in its annual report on global shadow banking. The FSB estimates the Chinese
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shadow banking system at $7 trillion in 2016 based on its conservative “narrow” measure of
shadow banking.21 The system accounts for approximately 16% of global shadow banking assets
and 2% of total global financial assets.22 For comparison, the United States accounts for 31% of
the global total and is thus twice the size of the Chinese shadow market.23 However, the
mainstream banking sector in China is the largest in the world at $33 trillion and twice the size of
the banking sector in the United States. 24 Therefore, while the absolute size of the Chinese
shadow banking market is concerning, it is a smaller proportion of the country’s domestic
financial system than shadow banking is in the United States.
The three stages of shadow banking vary in size. The creditor stage is approximately 77%
of China’s GDP, the intermediate stage is 50%, and the borrower stage is 55% in 2016.25 The
amount of shadow funds available from creditors is higher than shadow funds that borrowers
ultimately receive because a significant portion of WMP funds are diverted into bonds, the
interbank market, and “structured” intermediation that does not include direct lending to
borrowers. A key trend is that WMPs are rapidly shifting from guaranteed instruments (8% of
GDP) to non-guaranteed instruments (31% of GDP). While non-guaranteed instruments increase
returns for investors, they also increase systemic risk in the broader financial system.26
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF SHADOW BANKING IN CHINA
Shadow banking has grown especially quickly in China over the past decade due to three

interrelated factors:
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First, the supply of credit is inadequate for the high level of demand from growth-seeking
private and public entities. The Chinese financial system is dominated by four commercial
banks—Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, and Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China—which are partially state-owned and operate under supervision
of Communist Party leaders.27 The PBC imposes informal lending quotas to direct both the level
of credit growth and which sectors should receive funds.28 The commercial banks lend most of
their deposits to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local government-backed investment
entities.29 Preferred lending practices restrict the supply of private credit and favor large
commercial enterprises with established reputations who can access traditional forms of credit.
While there is evidence that officials are relaxing enforcement of quotas as the PBC transitions
towards a market-based interest rate regime, SMEs and other higher risk borrowers continue to
face barriers.30
Strong and unmet demand for credit also comes from the public sector. Local
governments are incentivized to invest in large infrastructure projects, such as building roads and
factories, in order to meet central government growth targets. Historically, the central
government did not permit local governments to issue bonds, eliminating a key source of credit
for local economic development plans.31 A massive government stimulus plan in 2009 led to an
overextension of credit to local governments, which quickly reversed as bank managers decided
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to only offer credit to the most reliable SOEs instead.32 As a result, local governments turned to
shadow banking and created local investment enterprises to channel the funds into projects. In
2015, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) approved a local debt swap scheme through which
provincial governments can sell low-interest bonds directly to commercial banks to replace highinterest loans from the shadow banking sector.33 While this creates a mainstream credit channel
for local governments, it is not a replacement for open local government bond markets and could
create additional market distortions.
Second, a lack of regulatory expertise and oversight allows the shadow banking system to
circumvent traditional barriers to credit activity and regulation. The key regulators of the banking
sector are the PBC, MoF, and CBRC. However, no central government entity officially oversees
shadow banking. Instead, non-professional regulators such as the Ministry of Commerce and
local government-appointed departments are tasked with handling shadow banking issues day-today.34 Decentralization of authority means that rules for financing guarantee companies vary by
jurisdiction and there is no official reporting to any national regulatory authority. The regulatory
gap increases the lack of transparency of shadow banking activity and provides local officials
with opportunities for corruption.
Third, the global financial crisis in 2009 led to a contraction in mainstream credit and
increased private demand for shadow banking. The most prominent example comes from the city
of Wenzhou in Zhejiang province. Wenzhou grew rapidly beginning in the 1980s because of its
concentration of entrepreneurs and high level of private sector development. Due to the global
financial crisis in 2009, the Chinese government imposed tight restrictions on credit. Businesses
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in Wenzhou turned to “underground banks” to fill the gap. Shadow banking offered an
alternative to strict interest rate ceilings on deposit accounts, a result of tight monetary policy
after the government’s crisis stimulus package, and allowed speculators to take advantage of
rising real estate prices.35 Local officials allowed informal financing arrangements with almost
no regulation or oversight.36 Excessive shadow lending led to the city’s financial collapse in
2011-2012, when an estimated 80% of businessmen defaulted on debts, disappeared, or
committed suicide.37 In response, the central government issued lending guidelines and
developed bank stress tests, but the shadow banking market had already expanded in size and
complexity.38
III.

BENEFITS AND RISKS OF SHADOW BANKING
Shadow banking offers many benefits to the Chinese financial system. It is an important

source of credit for local governments, private enterprises of all sizes, and individual investors.
Access to cheaper and more flexible credit arrangements encourages business investment and the
efficient flow of money, which in turn drive economic growth. Shadow banking provides higher
returns for savers limited by PBC control of deposit and lending interest rates.39 As China moves
up the economic value chain, investors and borrowers will continue to seek a wider range of
options and greater sophistication in financial markets. Innovation in shadow banking fills the
gap until regulators and the Communist Party leadership permit greater flexibility in monetary
policy and decrease restrictions on capital flows.
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However, shadow banking creates significant risks. Shadow banking does not fall under
the purview of mainstream systemic risk assessments and evades international risk management
standards. For example, a key attraction of credit intermediation is that it allows entities to lessen
or avoid onerous capital liquidity standards. China aggressively began implementation of the
Basel III capital adequacy requirements in 2007 to comply with international regulatory
standards.40 While the largest banks met Basel tests as early as 2013, many small and mediumsized banks could not or would not comply.41 However, regulators instituted a ban on packaging
off-balance sheet loans into WMPs in early 2018 to push banks into traditional lending and curb
shadow lending.42 This should force banks to move assets back onto their balance sheets,
increasing transparency and legitimizing government financial stability initiatives.
Despite such positive government efforts, two unique Chinese legal institutions continue
to threaten financial stability and the rule of law. First, implicit government guarantees create a
moral hazard problem. The central government has traditionally acted for decades as a lender of
last resort for failing financial institutions. In the event of a bank failure, credit intermediaries
assume that the central government will bail out every actor along the shadow banking lending
chain, particularly if the funds originated at one of the large commercial banks.43 In 2015, China
introduced a deposit insurance scheme as a step towards clarifying bank resolution procedures.44
This signaled to the shadow banking system that the government would allow financial
institutions to fail, decreasing the incentive to engage in risky informal lending. However, the
deposit insurance system is in its early stages and remains largely untested.
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Second, the government imposes harsh criminal penalties for “economic crimes.” The
judicial system has the discretion to impose long prison sentences and even the death penalty for
underground credit activity.45 While the list of official economic crimes covers an array of
activity and is part of the broader Communist Party fight against corruption, shadow banking
prosecutions in particular may be motivated by more than punishing illegal activity.46 Gao
suggests that the government uses harsh criminal punishment instead of administrative fines to
deter private actors from competing with SOEs for deposits.47 Penalties for financial fraud and
money-laundering are necessary, but capital punishment for widespread quasi-legal activity is
excessive. Harsh criminal punishment incentivizes shadow banking actors to engage in even
more opaque transactions, hindering regulatory efforts and financial reporting. Furthermore,
foreign investors will demand a higher level of independence from the judicial system as the
Chinese financial sector liberalizes, and disproportionate punishment may decrease judicial
credibility on the international stage.
IV.

REFORMS AND POLICY SOLUTIONS
Shadow banking developed in China largely because of a lack of access to affordable

credit and inadequate risk management systems. Therefore, mere bans on particular types of
credit intermediation or harsh penalties will not be enough to mitigate risk from the shadow
banking system. Regulators will need a comprehensive approach in order to permanently shift
shadow lending to regulated mainstream instruments. China can achieve a more sustainable,
flexible regulatory environment for its quickly maturing financial sector by instituting legal and

Gao, supra note 29, at 132.
See Benjamin Kang Lim, China's CEFC Chairman Investigated for Suspected Economic Crimes,
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47
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institutional reforms, reducing government intervention in macroeconomic planning and
monetary policy, and addressing broader domestic and international concerns.
A. Legal and Institutional Reforms
Recognizing the risks of unregulated credit intermediation, the Chinese government
increasingly formalized its efforts in the past five years to enhance supervision of the shadow
banking system. The State Council, the highest administrative body in China, published a report
in 2013 identifying the agencies responsible for various supervisory tasks: the State Council,
CBRC, China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Insurance Regulatory Commission
(CIRC), and the PBC.48 In order to increase transparency, the State Council directed the PBC to
create a statistical framework for shadow banking and called for stronger commercial and
individual credit rating systems.49 The report distinguished between credit intermediaries with
and without financial licenses.50 It also recognized that some credit intermediaries are not subject
to any supervision at all while others receive insufficient supervision or evade supervision.51 This
demonstrates that the national government was aware of the range of shadow banking activity in
China and intended to target regulatory efforts based on the scope and characteristics of
particular types of credit intermediation.
However, regulatory objectives remain unclear and delegation of authority overlaps
among the national agencies with supervisory responsibilities. President Xi Jinping’s recent
efforts to centralize power and reorganize the government bureaucracy may provide needed

48
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clarity.52 The reorganization includes significant changes to the structure of the financial
regulators and explicitly addresses regulation of shadow banking. First, the government created a
Financial Stability and Development Committee in July 2017 to coordinate high-level policy on
financial stability and reforms of the financial sector.53 Second, the CBRC and CIRC will be
merged into one commission in order to centralize risk management efforts, particularly for
shadow banking.54 Third, the PBC will gain significant power beyond its current monetary
policy authority because it will take over the previous CBRC and CIRC functions of drafting key
regulations and prudential oversight.55 The ultimate effect of these changes on shadow banking
activity remains to be seen, but they do signal increased government focus on actively managing
systemic financial risk and curing deficiencies in the regulatory structure.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) advocated for additional reforms in its 2017
annual Financial Sector Stability Assessment for China. The report emphasized regulatory clarity
and legal reform as key components of financial stability.56 The IMF Executive Board explained:
[Analysts] stressed the importance of adequate legal protection, clear institutional
mandates and accountability to ensure sufficient independence and resources for
oversight agencies to act effectively and foster interagency cooperation…. Strengthening
the financial safety net and the legal framework for bank resolution would improve
incentives and reduce the potential risks to public resources that could arise from the
failure of financial institutions.57
52
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To address shadow banking risk, the IMF recommended that the government improve legal and
regulatory processes for bankruptcies of insolvent WMPs, eliminate implicit guarantees (which
have no legal basis) and lending to particular sectors, and limit asset market interventions to high
risk periods.58 These reforms would help shift the government’s focus from economic
development objectives to financial stability and provide clear, predictable risk management
procedures for credit intermediaries. They would not completely eliminate excessive risk in the
shadow banking market, but they would likely shift funds into more transparent instruments and
more quickly resolve failing credit intermediaries.
B. Government Intervention in Macroeconomic Planning and Monetary Policy
The legal and institutional reforms proposed above would be strengthened by economic
reform. Decreased government intervention in macroeconomic planning would shift the
government’s primary focus from achieving economic development goals to encouraging
financial modernization and stability. Shadow banking expanded in part because of strict
government restrictions on the amount and quality of credit in the banking system. Increasing the
decision-making authority of financial institutions would allow them more flexibility to make
efficient market decisions and diminish the incentive to turn to unregulated sources of credit. The
CBRC has already shown a willingness to make some compromises on government control; for
example, in early 2018 it eased rules on high loan-loss provisions to align more with
international standards and encourage banks to engage in traditional forms of lending.59
Further interest rate and currency liberalization is also needed. Market-based interest
rates and a more flexible exchange rate would help manage systemic risk by allowing the market

Financial Sector Stability Assessment, supra note 56, at 11.
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https://www.ft.com/content/4cc6ee1c-21cc-11e8-9a70-08f715791301.
58

59

14

to correct imbalances on an on-going basis without waiting for government intervention.
Additionally, interest rate reform would not only help established financial institutions but also
individuals and SMEs. First, increasing or eliminating the interest rate cap on ordinary bank
deposits would increase the incentive to save, because depositors would get a more reasonable
rate of return.60 Second, lowering restrictions on the lending rate would increase the incentive to
lend to SMEs. This would decrease the volume of shadow banking activity because it would
solve the initial problem—lack of access to affordable credit. Third, reforms of usury laws would
increase the availability of credit while protecting consumers from excessive exposure. As Gao
explained, “Chinese law currently prevents all kinds of usury without having a clear definition of
usury, and current judicial practice regards all interest rates that exceed four times the interest
rate set by the People's Bank as illegal, even if the interest is reasonable and risky to an
acceptable degree.”61 However, liberalization is likely to continue to be very gradual given the
PBC’s generally cautious approach.62
C. Broader Domestic and International Concerns
Broader domestic and international pressures exist that exacerbate the risks of shadow
banking in the Chinese financial system and contribute to global financial instability. A major
domestic imbalance is the central government’s significant authority and control over provincial
and local government oversight of financial institutions. While standardized rules are essential to
ensuring consistent supervision and eliminating regulatory arbitrage, local officials engage in
deals with local credit intermediaries and corruption to evade top-down control.
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A major international concern is China’s commitment to maintaining international risk
management standards and opening its domestic financial sector. While the largest banks in
China are generally compliant with Basel III standards, the IMF noted that higher and more
tailored capital requirements may be needed in China to counterbalance volatility as its financial
sector expands and modernizes.63 Additionally, the United States is concerned with government
subsidies to Chinese banks, especially SOEs. The 2001 World Trade Organization accession
agreement for China required the opening of domestic financial markets to foreign banks over a
five-year period, but American banks complain that they still face barriers.64 While China
recently announced it would raise foreign ownership limits for financial institutions from 4950% to majority 51% in 2018, analysts are skeptical of how much this will promote openness.65
V.

SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
The shadow banking system in China has significantly expanded in size and complexity

over the past decade due to a lack of access to affordable credit, regulatory gaps, and government
restrictions on lending. While credit intermediation fulfills high demand for funding, lack of
transparency, implicit government guarantees, and corruption pose significant risks to financial
stability. Further legal, institutional, and economic reforms are needed. Recent consolidation of
power at the PBC and creation of the Financial Stability and Development Committee may
promote regulatory clarity and financial stability. However, the success of these administrative
changes remains indeterminate, and the Chinese government may face backlash from the
international community if it does not promote financial liberalization and transparency.
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